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International Human Rights at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 
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Abstract: Speculates as to why the human-rights revolution is increasingly likely to dominate our foreign-policy atten-
tions in the decades to come.  Ventures some predictions, of particular interest perhaps to international lawyers, about 
where the cause of international human rights is heading. 
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[pg167]**We are in the midst of the human rights revolution, perhaps the most important de-
velopment in the cultural history of homo sapiens.  In the United States since 1945 equal rights for 
blacks, via the civil rights movement, and equal rights for women, via the movement toward the 
Equal Rights Amendment, have fundamentally altered our perceptions and our laws.  Internation-
ally, the Nuremberg trials following World War II removed the shield that officials thought they 
had when they adopted and implemented genocidal policies directed against religious or ethnic mi-
norities.  The cause of human rights has since moved to issues that are perhaps less dramatic, but 
nevertheless may be broader in scope. 
In this essay I would like to speculate as to why the human-rights revolution is increasingly 
likely to dominate our foreign-policy attentions in the decades to come.  Then I want to venture 
some predictions, of particular interest perhaps to international lawyers, about where I think the 
cause of international human rights is heading.  My purpose is simply to help increase awareness 
and sensitivity about these matters.  Of course, prediction is anybody's guess, and as Richard Falk 
remarked at a recent panel of the American Society of International Law, the hardest thing of all to 
predict is the future.  
  
I.  Human Rights and Realpolitik 
While militarily weak states have a stake in peacefulness secured by international law, militarily 
powerful states have a different motivation for accepting the rule of law throughout the world.  
Militarily powerful states are not themselves vulnerable to attack, but their citizens who travel out-
side their borders are vulnerable.  Yet travel abroad is a necessity: a [pg168] state first of all must 
send ambassadors abroad; it also sends other diplomatic and consular personnel; its political leaders 
on occasion travel abroad; it may have soldiers stationed on bases in other countries; its performing 
artists may be visiting other countries; its students may be studying in foreign universities; its news 
reporters may be investigating news events or sports events abroad; many of its citizens may be 
touring abroad; and last but not least, it will have vast commercial dealings abroad as its business-
persons engage in trade on the world market and investment in other countries, and as multinational 
corporations proliferate.  All these people are vulnerable.  Even if their home country has a huge 
stockpile of nuclear weapons, those weapons will be next to useless in the face of illegal incarcera-
tion in a foreign prison or kidnapping by a terrorist organization.  As the United States learned as a 
result of the outrageous taking of diplomatic hostages in Tehran in 1979 and the kidnappings of or-
dinary citizens in Lebanon in the mid-1980s, vast military power and nuclear superiority count for 
very little in terms of getting those citizens back home safely. 
Militarily powerful states are increasingly recognizing the vulnerability represented by their 
citizens who venture across their boundaries.  This recognition comes largely as the result of the 




create instant empathy for individuals who are in trouble in foreign lands.  An American in trouble 
abroad is not merely an isolated adventurer off on a personal frolic; rather, the individual is a part of 
this country just as Rhode Island is a part of this country.  This perception that a country is not con-
fined to its own territory but rather travels abroad when its citizens travel abroad is heightened by 
the recognition of the importance of businesspersons engaging in trade abroad to help the consumer 
at home in an increasingly interdependent world economy.  The cultural values of tourism also feed 
into a nation's perception of its own worth.  Nations increasingly are perceiving individuals who 
engage in entrepreneurial activities abroad as persons whose activities have a national-interest com-
ponent as well as the more obvious personal-profit motive. 
As a result, the creation of a world where basic human rights are respected is increasingly im-
portant to militarily powerful states.  The rhetoric in the United States associated with Henry Kiss-
inger and the "national security" hardliners is beginning to sound stale.  The United States is not 
militarily vulnerable to a hostile takeover by any other nation; we do not need military help from 
others in the form of collective security pacts as far as our own national security is concerned.  Nev-
ertheless, our citizens traveling abroad desperately need the protection of the international law of 
human rights. 
[pg169]Even as the human-rights issue becomes increasingly real to Americans, signs of a thaw 
are emerging in the Soviet Union, where the "national security" hardliners predominate to a far 
greater extent than in the United States.  The initiatives known as glasnost represent a perception, 
almost at the eleventh hour, that the cause of international human rights is consistent with, and not 
inimical to, the fundamental interests of the Soviet state.  Naturally the hardliners there, as here, re-
sist these trends.  It is not simply a cliche that generals are trained to fight the last war.  Military 
leaders in both the United States and the Soviet Union have a World War II complex that probably 
will not pass until all those persons who experienced that war are gone from the scene.  The Soviet 
Union still plans for, and fears, an armored invasion eastward from Europe.  The anachronism is as 
striking as the Kissinger-type strategists in the United States talking about the international balance 
of power as if we still lived in the time of Metternich, discussing nuclear weapons that can be used 
"tactically," and plotting nuclear exchanges that can be "contained." 
The biggest defect in the hardliner view of the world is the failure to recognize that even on the 
assumption that this is a bipolar world with the two superpowers locked in a military staredown for 
immense stakes, the reason for the increasing success of American influence in the world since the 
1950s is not that we have a few more nuclear submarines than they, or a few more bases, or that 
their ICBMs have forced us to draw together NATO and SEATO powers in tight collective security 
alliances.  Rather, what has occurred is the inherent and natural power of the free market system to 
spread by itself.  Private property has won over collective property, a lesson Stalin refused to learn 
when he butchered ten million Russian farmers who did not quite fit into his notion of agrarian re-
form.  So long as the Soviet Union competed against us in third-world markets by the use of state-
owned enterprises that were soon perceived as the advance guard of potential military domination, 
we were able to out-compete for those markets and allegiances even though the technology prof-
fered by the Soviets was artificially subsidized.  In short, our commercial initiatives since World 
War II have gained ground against communist-sponsored offerings even though the communist na-
tions could offer a more attractive price.  Uncommitted and third-world nations have perceived that 
the lower price was too high if it meant vulnerability to Soviet influence and control.  Of course, the 




approaches.  If this means more effective competition for the United States, we should welcome it; 
we have considerable expertise dealing in competitive markets. 
Even as the Soviets are beginning to realize the need to move toward individual economic rights 
as a way of competing in the world markets, [pg170] the United States is beginning to realize the 
deep affinity between a free market and human rights.  As recently as the Nixon and Ford admini-
strations, international human rights were considered an annoyance in the foreign-policy realm.  
Support for the Shah of Iran was predicated on a Kissinger-type notion of collective military secu-
rity that refused to acknowledge human-rights atrocities committed by the Shah or the rising discon-
tent of the Iranian people living in a police state.  The Carter administration was a transitional pe-
riod.  In perhaps his most historically memorable utterance, Jimmy Carter said that human rights is 
the "soul" of American foreign policy.  Yet inconsistently he continued support for the Shah (in-
cluding allowing the Iranian police to practice their brutal methods within the United States itself), a 
policy that led to the downfall of his administration.  Under President Reagan, with inconsistencies 
here and there, human rights has increasingly occupied center stage in our dealings with other coun-
tries.  The administration's present stance against Pinochet of Chile would hardly have been imagin-
able fifteen years ago, and the toppling of Marcos in the Philippines and Duvalier in Haiti are truly 
historic signs of nails in Metternich's coffin.  (Of course, those in the administration who have been 
frustrated with these events found a ready channel for their activities in supporting the contras in 
Nicaragua.  This was pure we-versus-them military adventurism, inimical to human rights.  But 
given the current Irangate investigations and prosecutions, even this siphon for realpolitik energy 
bids to be clamped off.) 
Elsewhere I have attempted to spell out the deep affinity between free markets and human 
rights. FN1 Suffice it to say here that a free world market relies upon individual units (persons, cor-
porations) competing with each other to maximize products and services that other individual units 
desire.  The profit motive that constitutes the engine driving the free market only works when the 
heavy hand of government and bureaucracy is absent, as Eastern bloc countries have learned to their 
dismay.  A free market requires recognition of private worth; the individual units making up the 
market engage alternatively in production and consumption, activities that would be senseless were 
it not for a recognition that the purpose is the satisfaction of individual wants and not the fulfillment 
of some abstruse ideology.  In contrast to free markets is pervasive regulation by government 
which, as Ayn Rand so convincingly demonstrated in her many works, can only be accomplished by 
legions of bureaucrats.  Bureaucrats, as Rand demonstrated, do not produce; they merely consume.  
Hence the more bureaucrats per capita (which we loosely call "big government"), the more the non-
bureaucrats are enslaved to feed, clothe, and house the [pg171] bureaucrats.  To justify their exis-
tence, bureaucrats arrogate decisional authority to themselves and progressively reduce the sphere 
of freedom and human dignity of the nonbureaucrats.  Thus the clash of free markets versus bureau-
cratic control parallels the clash of human rights versus dictatorship. FN2  
 
The free enterprise system will not of itself ensure the fruition of all human rights.  Irving Kris-
tol's phrase, "Two cheers for capitalism!" is instructive.  It has long been evident that free markets 
need the sort of limited regulation that enables them to remain free.  Without antitrust laws, for ex-
ample, business combinations can become so powerful as to extend their drive toward monopoliza-
tion into the political realm, thus subverting the free market at its central nervous system.  Fine-
tuning the law to serve free enterprise by keeping it free, while avoiding excess regulation that leads 




know and understand the law.  Let us turn, then, to the fine-tuning necessary in the international 
arena as we look ahead to some of the major problems of the end of the millennium. 
  
II.  Human Rights Issue-Areas 
Human rights problems are not the only, nor the major, problems facing our small green planet.  
We live under the constant threat of nuclear destruction.  We are in danger of depleting the fragile 
ozone layer that miraculously shields us from the sun's deadly ultraviolet rays.  We are destroying 
our tropical rain forests and thus may create an irreversible imbalance in the life-sustaining compo-
nents of our atmosphere.  AIDS and perhaps mutations of the AIDS virus are life threats to our spe-
cies.  These are extremely real, extremely serious, and unique threats to the human race (whose ex-
istence, so far, is measured in the thousands of years, compared to the dinosaurs who ruled the earth 
for a hundred million years and then were totally wiped out).  To talk, then, about human rights 
seems to focus on a problem of less than vital import.  Yet we have to operate on all fronts.  And the 
human rights problems are serious enough. 
  
A.  PROBLEMS OF ASSOCIATIONAL EXCLUSIVITY 
The major cause of strife and bloodshed in the past few centuries has been, to put it simply, the 
clash between the desire of some people to live and associate exclusively in a given territory with 
"their own kind," and [pg172] those who resist such associational exclusivities.  The terms "preju-
dice" and "intolerance" can apply equally to both groups.  Insiders can be said to be prejudiced 
against people not of their own kind, while outsiders can be said to be prejudiced against people 
who want exclusivity of association.  Hence terms such as "prejudice," "intolerance," and "discrimi-
nation," although widely used in human-rights discourse, do not get us very far analytically. 
Another term much used in this context is "self-determination," which is also more of a rhetori-
cal than an analytical tool.  Under the banner of self-determination, empires have been dismantled, 
former colonies have become states, and the number of independent nations in the world is higher 
than ever before.  Despite such exercises of self-determination, however, minorities in many nations 
today cry for their political self-determination or some degree of autonomy. FN3 Yet, as Ivor 
Jennings stated the analytical question, "the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are 
the people." FN4 If there is a plebiscite, who decides who is to participate in it?  Should the deci-
sion be made according to geographic area, or according to some authority that determines who the 
"indigenous" people are?  Professor Pomerance, who has given careful thought to this problem, 
concludes that if self-determination means anything, it signifies a continuum of rights.  One must 
maximize individual as well as group rights while respecting the rights of other individuals and col-
lectivities: "Alternatives such as federal schemes, autonomous regimes, minority rights, guarantees 
of non-discrimination, and the right of option, may present themselves as reasonable and just solu-
tions in some instances." FN5  
Perhaps, analytically, no "self-determination" right as such exists because of the intractable 
problem of determining who is entitled to self-determination.  Nevertheless, we still should listen to 
and evaluate claims for self-determination when minority individuals and groups claim that they 
have been discriminated against with regard to their human rights.  The self-determination problem 
thus transmutes into the problem of securing respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms.  
We can have more sympathy for groups seeking self-determination if their complaint is that their 




we may perhaps put aside the self-determination matter and see whether, if respect for their human 
rights [pg173] is established, they might decide that associational exclusivity is not what they really 
wanted after all.  The challenge for international scholars is to work their way out of the self-
determination morass by seeing if focusing upon basic human rights and freedoms will either dis-
solve the problem or at least suggest the merits of alternative political solutions. 
  
B.  THE RIGHT TO SUBSISTENCE 
Many international conventions contain provisions on the right to food, to shelter, and to cloth-
ing. FN6 I suggest we view them as a single right: the right to subsistence.  Every human being born 
into this world has a powerful claim on the rest of us to that minimal share of resources that will 
barely sustain its life.  Extremists on one side will say that that is not enough; justice requires that 
we share more of our resources with those who are extremely poor. FN7 Extremists on the other 
side will say that no government has the right to take away any of our property to distribute it to the 
poor, even if the poor as a consequence will starve to death.  The debate will not progress if it polar-
izes at these extreme positions.  Instead, the world needs to develop a minimalist theory advocating 
a right to bare subsistence, but only bare subsistence, even at the expense of invading the property 
of others through taxation.  Customary international law is moving in this direction.  
A right to subsistence is a right that only, and necessarily, attaches to people who need minimal 
subsistence in order to survive.  It does not attach to the states where those people are located.  
Thus, if a rich nation A distributes food to a poor nation B, the government officials of B would be 
guilty of a criminal violation of international law (under the theory advocated here) if they then fail 
to distribute the food free of charge to their citizens.  Hence, the subsistence theory has "bite" in that 
it applies to all states, including the home states of the people who need subsistence. 
Many lawyers fear that the adoption of multilateral conventions proclaiming a right to subsis-
tence would infringe upon the freedom of individuals to be charitable or not to be charitable as they 
see fit, and also make an unprincipled inroad into the right of private property.  These are legitimate 
fears and can be briefly addressed. 
[pg174]First, it is certainly true in one sense that coerced charity is not charity.  However, sup-
pose a group of people feel that a certain charity is important.  Even if all the members of the group 
are urged to contribute, some will hold out on the assumption that the others will take care of the 
problem.  To avoid the "free-riders," the group enacts legislation requiring everyone to contribute.  
It is hard for a potential free-rider to oppose that to which in principle he has agreed.  Hence, the 
resulting law makes it possible to avoid free-riders by requiring a contribution from everyone.  The 
same reasoning can be applied to address effectively the problem of people starving to death.  Par-
ticipation in multilateral conventions is a free choice that results in group charity, but for a noble 
end. 
Second, the inroad into private property is in principle a fear that accompanies any taxation for 
social welfare.  Taxation for social welfare is, at bottom, robbing Peter to pay Paul; its philosophic 
justification is that Peter agreed to it by participating in a democracy that was sensitive to Paul's ba-
sic needs.  Its practical justification is more interesting.  A tax that is in reality a transfer payment 
(that is, taking from Peter to pay Paul) only works if it is a minor tax.  If the tax gets too large, Peter 
stops earning income, sits back, and joins Paul in wanting to be paid.  Clearly, Peter needs a suffi-
cient incentive to produce so that he chooses production over passive consumption.  The difference 




$200, and the $200 is paid over to Paul, Peter gets only $300 for working compared to $200 that he 
would get for not working.  Peter will undoubtedly choose not to work.  Then, with Peter having 
joined Paul in the ranks of the unemployed, Mary, who is working, has to pay a higher transfer tax.  
If Mary makes $500 a week, she may have to pay $250 in order to support all the Peters and Pauls 
who are not working.  Mary then quits, because she nets only $250 a week for working while she 
can get $250 a week for not working.  At this point, everyone stops working.  No income is left to 
tax. 
Hence, the transfer payments have to be slight enough to keep nearly all the workers in the labor 
pool and nearly all the entrepreneurs in business.  If the transfer payments are going outside the 
country (as they would in the case of providing subsistence to starving people abroad), the tolerable 
amount has to be quite small in order for the transfer payment system to function at all.  The trans-
fer payments can be larger if the funds are kept within the country (as in Social Security, unem-
ployment, and welfare taxation in the United States) because the money that is paid over to the re-
cipients is soon spent and finds its way back into the economy, increasing the gross income of those 
who are working. FN8  
[pg175]Another way to express this result, using morality instead of economics, is that a univer-
sal system of human rights must respect the right of a person to the fruits of his or her own labor 
equally with the right of another person not to starve to death.  We are enslaved to the extent that 
the fruits of our labor are taken away from us.  We can tolerate minimal enslavement to save chil-
dren from starving, but moral imperatives would begin to lose their force if pressed much beyond 
that point.  Since starvation is a Malthusian check upon runaway population growth, any moral im-
perative that we allow ourselves to be taxed to save children from starvation would have to accom-
modate our insistence upon non-Malthusian alternatives such as education in family planning and 
birth control to go along with the free food. 
Nations are already moving, in fitful steps, toward such a solution.  In my view, this movement 
is a sign of our increased cultural awareness.  If children are starving to death in any part of the 
world, I have a moral obligation to do something about it.  The role for lawyers is to make what I do 
much more effective than my sending a CARE package that might wind up being confiscated and 
sold by some government officials for their own benefit at the dock of the receiving country.  I 
would not feel tremendously coerced if a small tax were levied upon me and upon everyone else, if 
I knew that the proceeds would really go, one hundred percent, to prevent actual starvation. 
  
C.  THE RIGHT OF CHILDREN TO FAMILY SUPPORT AND NURTURE 
Going beyond bare subsistence, infants and children need family support and nurture.  While 
there is no feasible nor desirable way to require adults to take care of needy infants, throughout the 
world many childless couples are eager to adopt and raise children.  Unfortunately, at the same 
time, countless infants and children are starving to death.  Many of these are orphaned or aban-
doned; others presently have parents who are also starving and who would be willing, for the chil-
dren's sake, to give them up for adoption.  An uncluttered view of human rights would seem to indi-
cate that the requirement here is simply to match needy children with willing foster parents.  It fol-
lows that governments should assist in the distribution of needy children in their own countries to 
willing foster parents in any foreign country. 
[pg176]Governments are reluctant to do this.  They do not want to admit that their own people 




their future generations being shipped off to other countries.  As a result they throw roadblocks into 
the transnational adoption process, or corrupt officials demand exorbitant bribes.  Nor are the re-
ceiving governments more cooperative.  They maintain immigration quotas which, whatever the 
justification (if any) such quotas might have for alien adults, are extraordinarily cruel when applied 
to infants from abroad who need adoption.  In this area of human rights, then, what is needed is an 
articulation of the child's right to family support and nurture, an examination of its status under 
evolving customary international law, and a realization that the offenders here may be the tradi-
tional subjects and objects of international law: states themselves.  Then we have to beg, cajole, or 
shame the governments into putting into place effective transnational adoption procedures. 
  
D.  CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
When one contemplates the vast problems associated with the foregoing human-rights issues—
the right to subsistence, the right to a family, and associational exclusivities—one is tempted to say 
that the more "Western" assertions of civil and political rights pale by comparison.  Yet it is unfair 
to weigh sets of human rights.  It is clear that Western support for human rights depends on regard-
ing political and civil rights at least on a par with economic and social rights. 
The right to subsistence is certainly "basic," yet that overworked term can also be applied to the 
right of habeas corpus.  The need for governments to distribute food to starving people is "basic," 
but so is the free-speech right of people to criticize governments.  In the Brecht-Weill musical 
drama The Threepenny Opera there is the line, "First feed the face, and then talk right and wrong." 
In one sense, though, we have to talk right and wrong before we can persuade anyone to feed the 
face. 
It is amazing that, on the one hand, the more that governments tolerate criticism by their citi-
zens, the more the citizens regard the governments as legitimate; and yet the more that governments 
allow free speech, the more governmental elites resent being criticized and do what they can (and 
the less democratic the regime, the more they can do) to suppress speech.  This tension reflects a 
basic urge on the part of some governmental elites toward Caesarism—to experience power as a 
function of the arbitrariness and repressiveness of their rule.  In this respect, freedom of speech is 
the most fundamental human right, because it acts as a check, through ridicule and exposure as well 
as debate, upon the tendency toward [pg177] governmental excess and runaway power accumula-
tion.  The inquiries into Watergate and Irangate were not diseases of the American system, but 
rather triumphs.  The American people may have ended up trusting politicians less, but their trust of 
the political process must have increased.  It takes a healthy political process to expose lawbreaking 
government officials. 
The more free speech and self-criticism that takes place in some countries, the more likely it is 
to spread, through the media and, by example, to other countries.  Scholars of international custom-
ary law should react to attempts by some governments to jam the airwaves and keep out unwelcome 
television signals; these practices, under the name of national sovereignty, are a direct affront to ba-
sic political and civil rights.  The world in the twenty-first century—if we survive the threat of nu-
clear devastation—could either be a people-first democratic world or a government-first totalitarian 
world, and the tendency toward either extreme could easily tip one way or the other at any time.  
Our first notice that the scales are tipping in the wrong direction is when leaders call for the tempo-
rary abridgment of basic civil or political rights.  They always have a popular cause at hand, and the 




In this respect, the more we are part of an international comprehensive system of civil and political 
rights, secured through multilateral conventions, the harder it will be for local officials to be able to 
abridge them.  That is our payoff right here at home.  Our payoff abroad, as I mentioned earlier in 
this essay, is that when freedom spreads to other lands, our nation becomes more secure in the 
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